Canada in United Kingdom

History: Political Unrest and First Elections

Lord Durham was given the task of identifying the causes of political unrest in the colonies of British North America and proposing solutions. His first recommendation was to give each colony responsible government – an idea London did not accept until some 10 years later. Radical Jack also proposed a second solution aimed at the one colony decidedly unlike the others – Lower Canada. Here, according to Durham’s diagnosis, the political problem was coupled with a cultural one. His solution could not have been simpler: to subjugate one of the two cultural groups to the other. The means also could not have been simpler: uniting Lower Canada with Upper Canada. Mathematically, Durham was quite right: every year since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, immigrants had been leaving the British Isles by the thousands to improve their lot in North America, while the inhabitants of Lower Canada could now depend only on themselves to increase their numbers.

Durham calculated: “If the population of Upper Canada is rightly estimated at 400,000, the English inhabitants of Lower Canada at 150,000, and the French at 450,000, the union of the two Provinces would not only give a clear English majority, but one which would be increased every year by the influence of English emigration; and I have little doubt that the French, when once placed, by the legitimate course of events and the working of natural causes, in a minority, would abandon their vain hopes of nationality …” (Cornell et al., 214)

The following warning accompanied Durham’s recommendation: “I am averse to every plan that has been proposed for giving an equal number of members to the two Provinces, in order to attain the temporary end of out-numbering the French, because I think the same object will be obtained without any violation of the principles of representation, and without any such appearance of injustice …” (Cornell et al., 214)

London finally accepted Durham’s recommendation for unification and created the Province of Canada from the two provinces: Canada East, still commonly known as Lower Canada, and Canada West, or Upper Canada. But London ignored Durham’s warning and gave each province the same number of representatives, even though Lower Canada had 150,000 more inhabitants than its neighbour. This measure would bear out Durham’s prediction: it would tend to “defeat the purposes of union, and perpetuate the ideas of disunion.” (Cornell et al., 214)

“Vote for no man whose conduct in private and public life is not above suspicion, and inquire with due diligence before you give your suffrages.” (William Lyon Mackenzie, Address to the reformers of Upper Canada, Toronto, September 1834)

All that remained was to have the union approved by the population affected, a task London entrusted to the governor general of British North America, Lord Sydenham, a highly ambitious and self-assured man – “the greatest coxcomb I ever saw, and the vainest dog,” as one of his contemporaries wrote in his personal journal. (DCB VII, 855) Sydenham soon realized that the success of his mission depended on the election of a group of representatives supportive of the new regime. In Lower Canada, the largely French-Canadian population unanimously opposed the union, while in Upper Canada, ultra-Conservatives and extremist Reformers opposed it as well. But Sydenham knew that, under the terms of the act, the governor had the power to set the boundaries for certain ridings, appoint returning officers, select the location of polling stations and set the election date. Moreover, as governor, Sydenham was also commander-in-chief of the army and head of government. He was certainly not the type of person to trouble himself with scruples; in his view, the end justified the means.

Beginning in early 1840, he did everything possible to win the forthcoming election. “He plans and talks of nothing else,” wrote his secretary. (Abella, 328) In Upper Canada, Sydenham acted like a party leader, naming most of the candidates he wanted to see elected. He made promises or threats, depending on the circumstances. For example, to persuade them to withdraw, he offered government positions to two candidates campaigning for votes in Bytown. He also threatened to deprive voters of government grants if his candidate was defeated. He called on officials to back his supporters and appointed returning officers dedicated to his cause. By the fall of 1840, Sydenham was assured of a victory in Upper Canada. In mid-October, the Toronto Herald reproduced the list of 26 candidates who were also government employees and concluded, “His Excellency should nominate the whole of the members and not beguile us with ‘shadows of a free election’.” (Abella, 332)

In Lower Canada, where he could hope to see only a few candidates elected, Sydenham resorted to other ploys. He shamelessly readjusted the boundaries of urban ridings. He cut off the mainly French-Canadian suburbs from ridings in the cities of Québec, Montréal and Trois-Rivières, keeping only the downtown English-dominated cores. Nearly all voters in the suburbs were thus deprived of the vote, since in the rural ridings to which the suburbs were now attached, tenants did not yet have the vote. To increase the anglophone vote in Sherbrooke, Sydenham added on the neighbouring town of Lennoxville. By this single boundary change alone, the governor guaranteed the election of six of his candidates in a community where he had previously been assured of just one seat.

In each rural riding, Sydenham set up a single polling station, located not in the centre of the riding but at the perimeter and, where possible, in an English enclave. For example, in the riding of Terrebonne, the polling station was set up at New Glasgow, a small Irish and Scottish community at the northern extremity of the riding, a few days’ travel from its centre, which had a strong French-Canadian majority. The same tactic was used in several other ridings, including Ottawa, Chambly and Berthier. Finally, by holding the election in early March, a time of year when the roads were virtually impassable, Sydenham could count on a low turnout among the French-Canadian electorate.

Not content with all these pre-election schemes, the governor intervened in the election itself. In Kingston, on the third day of voting, he dismissed an official named Robert Berrie, who the day before had voted against Sydenham’s candidate. The other officials quickly got the message; most supported the governor, and the rest abstained from voting. In some ridings where the vote was close, such as London, the governor had land patents granted in extremis to his supporters but not to his opponents, thus ensuring victory. In the ridings of Beauharnois, Vaudreuil, Chambly, Bonaventure, Rouville, Montréal and Terrebonne, he sent gangs of ruffians armed with clubs and guns to take over the polling stations and prevent his opponents from voting. The toll: one dead in Montréal, two in Vaudreuil and three in Beauharnois. In Terrebonne, to avoid a bloodbath, the French-Canadian Reform leader Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine withdrew his candidacy. Riots broke out in Upper Canada, and there were deaths in Toronto and in the counties of Durham and Halton West.

As commander-in-chief of the army, Sydenham did not hesitate to use the army for his own ends. He refused to send troops to protect 15 opposition candidates who sought protection, while granting the same protection to any of his supporters who requested it.

Through these and other underhanded tactics, Sydenham managed to win the election. In June 1841, he wrote proudly to Lord Russell, “I have gained a most complete victory. I shall carry the measures I want.” (Abella, 343) He did not savour his victory for long, however, as illness forced him to resign a month later. Lord Sydenham certainly did not invent election strong-arm tactics, but he used them to an extent never seen before. After his departure, election morals continued to decline in the Province of Canada. In this regard, the Canada of 1867 inherited an unenviable legacy.

Source: “A History of the Vote in Canada” (Ottawa, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 2007)

Resources

See Also

• Elections
• Vote

Notes