Bankruptcy in United Kingdom
Definition of Bankruptcy
In accordance with the work A Dictionary of Law, this is a description of Bankruptcy :
The state of a person who has been adjudged by a court to be insolvent (Compare winding-up). The court orders the compulsory administration of a bankrupt’s affairs so that his assets can be fairly distributed among his creditors. To declare a debtor to be bankrupt a creditor or the debtor himself must make an application (known as a bankruptcy petition) either to the High Court or to a county court. If a creditor petitions, he must show that the debtor owes him at least £750 and that the debtor appears unable to pay it.
The debtor’s inability to pay can be shown either by:
- the creditor making a formal demand in a special statutory form, and the debtor failing to pay within three weeks; or
- the creditor of a *judgment debtor being unsuccessful in enforcing payment of a judgment debt through the courts.
If the petition is accepted the court makes a *bankruptcy order. Within three weeks of the bankruptcy order, the debtor must usually submit a *statement of affairs, which the creditors may inspect. This may be followed by a *public examination of the debtor. After the bankruptcy order, the bankrupt’s property is placed in the hands of the *official receiver. The official receiver must either call a creditors’ meeting to appoint a *trustee in bankruptcy to manage the bankrupt’s affairs, or he becomes trustee himself. The trustee must be a qualified *insolvency practitioner. He takes possession of the bankrupt’s property and, subject to certain rules, distributes it among the creditors.
A bankrupt is subject to certain disabilities (See undischarged bankrupt). Bankruptcy is terminated when the court makes an order of *discharge, but a bankrupt who has not previously been bankrupt within the preceding 15 years is automatically discharged after three years.
Note: Find out some definitions of Bankruptcy in the legal Dictionaries.
See also voluntary arrangement.
Dissolution of Partnership: Bankruptcy
History
The subject was originally dealt with in the sole interest of creditors; it was considered fraudulent for a debtor to procure his own bankruptcy. Thus the earliest English statute on the subject, 34 & 35 Henry VIII. c. 4 (A.D. 1542), was directed against fraudulent debtors, and gave power to the lord chancellor and other high officers to seize their estates and divide them among the creditors, but afforded no relief to the debtor from his liabilities. Subsequent legislation modified this attitude and introduced the principle of granting relief to the bankrupt with or without the consent of the creditors, where he conformed to the provisions of the bankruptcy law, and under the act of 1825 the debtor was allowed himself to initiate proceedings. Since 1542 about forty acts of parliament have been passed, dealing with the many aspects of the subject, and slowly expanding, modifying and building up the highly complex system of administration which now exists.
Court of 1831
The courts exercising jurisdiction originally, consisted of commissioners appointed by the lord chancellor. But in 1831 a special court of bankruptcy was established, consisting of six commissioners with four judges as a court of review, and official assignees attached to the court for the purpose of getting in the distributing the bankrupt’s assets. Non-traders were originally excluded from the bankruptcy court, and a special court called the “court for relief of insolvent debtors” was instituted for their benefit, in which relief from the liability to imprisonment could be obtained on surrender of their property, but they were not discharged from their debts, subsequently-acquired property remaining liable.
Both of these courts were subsequently abolished, non-traders were permitted to obtain the benefit of the bankruptcy laws, including a discharge, and in 1869 the system of official assignees was swept away, and a new court of bankruptcy created with one of the vice-chancellors at its head as chief judge, and a number of subordinate registrars or inferior judges under him. This court has also now been abolished, and the business is administered by a judge of the high court specially appointed for the purpose by the lord chancellor, with registrars of the high court, who deal with the ordinary judicial routine of bankruptcy procedure in the London district, while similar duties are performed by the county-court judges throughout the country.
Rights of creditors
But the questions which have proved the most difficult to deal with, and which more than any others have been the cause of fluctuating and inconsistent legislation, have undoubtedly been those relating to the share which the creditors ought to have in the administration of the proceedings, and to special arrangements effected between a debtor and his creditors under conditions more or less beyond the control of the court. These two questions are largely intermixed, and the history of English legislation on these points and its results throw much light on the causes of the failure of the many attempts which have been made by the most eminent legal authorities to bring the law into a satisfactory condition. The right of creditors to exercise some control in bankruptcy over the realization of the debtor’s property through an assignee chosen by themselves was recognized at an early date, but this right was exercised subject to the supervision of the court which investigated the claims of creditors and determined who were entitled to take part in the proceedings. Provision was also made for the interim protection of the debtor’s property by official assignees attached to the court, who took possession until the creditors could be consulted, and under the supervision of the court audited the accounts of the creditor’s assignee. So long as this system continued substantial justice was generally secured; the claims of creditors were strictly investigated and only those who clearly proved their right before a competent court were entitled to take part in the proceedings. The bankrupt was released from his obligations, but only after strict inquiries into his conduct and under the exercise of judicial discretion. The accounts of assignees were also strictly investigated, and the costs of solicitors and other agents were taxed by officers of the court. But the system was found to be cumbrous, to lead to delay and too often to the absorption of a large part of the estate in costs, over the incurring of which there was a very ineffective control. Hence arose a demand for larger powers on the part of creditors, and the introduction into the bankruptcy procedure of the system of “arrangements” between the debtor and his creditors, either for the payment of a composition, or for the liquidation of the estate free from the control of the court.
Acts of 1825, 1831, 1842, 1849
At first these arrangements were carefully guarded. Under the act of 1825 a proposal for payment of a composition might be adopted only after the debtor had passed his examination in court, and with the consent of nine-tenths in number and value of his creditors assembled at a meeting. Upon such adoption the bankruptcy proceedings were superseded. Dissenting creditors, however, were not bound by the resolution, but could still take action against the debtor’s subsequently-acquired property. These powers were not found to be sufficiently elastic and the act failed to give public satisfaction. Attempts were made by the acts of 1831 and 1842 to remedy the defects complained of by a reconstitution of the bankruptcy court and its official system. But these measures also failed because they were based on the assumption that judicial bodies could exercise effective control over administrative action, a control for which they are naturally unsuited, and which they could only carry out by cumbrous and expensive methods of procedure. Under the act of 1849 a totally new principle was introduced by the provision that a deed of arrangement executed by six-sevenths in number and value of the creditors for £10 and upwards should be binding upon all the creditors without any proceedings in or supervision by the court. But the determination of the question who were or were not creditors was practically left to the debtor himself, without any opportunity for testing by independent investigation the claims of those who signed the deed to control the administration of the estate. It is not difficult to see, in the light of subsequent experience, how likely this provision was to encourage fraudulent arrangements, and to introduce laxity in the administration of debtors’ estates. A modification of the too stringent conditions of the act of 1825, which would have enabled a bankrupt to pay a composition on his debts, with the consent of a large proportion of his bona-fide creditors, and subject to the approval of the court, after hearing the objections of dissenting creditors, would doubtless have proved a beneficial reform, but the act of 1849 proceeded on a very different principle. Instead of reforming, it practically abolished judicial control. By avoiding Scylla it fell into Charybdis. To give any majority of creditors the power to release a debtor from his obligations to non-assenting creditors without full disclosure of his affairs, and without any exercise of judicial discretion or any investigation into the causes of the failure, or the conduct of the debtor, would in any circumstances have been to introduce a new and mischievous principle into legislation, for it would necessarily destroy the essential feature of such arrangements, that they are voluntary contracts, the responsibility for which lies solely with the parties entering into them. But to give such a power to creditors whose claims were subject to no independent investigation was to invite inevitable confusion and failure.
1861
Yet this was the dominating principle of English bankruptcy legislation for nearly thirty-five years. Its effect under the act of 1849 was, however, to some extent modified by subsequent decisions of the courts that to make a composition arrangement binding it must be accompanied by a complete cessio bonorum; but this qualification was removed by the act of 1861 which made such arrangements binding without a cessio and reduced the majority required to make a deed of arrangement binding on all the creditors, to a majority in number and three-fourths in value of those whose claims amounted to £10 and upwards. The result was an enormous increase in fraudulent arrangements. The then attorney-general, Sir Robert Collier, in introducing an amending act in 1869, described the abuses which had grown up under the 1849 and 1861 acts, as having the effect of enabling a bankrupt to “defraud those to whom he was indebted and to set them at defiance”; while Lord Cairns, the lord chancellor, in the House of Lords expressed the opinion that the large increase which had taken place in the annual insolvency of the country during the preceding years could not “be attributed to depression of trade but must be traced to the enormous facilities which are given to debtors who wish to be released from their debts on easy terms.” And yet in the legislation which ensued these facts were entirely ignored or lost sight of.
1869
It is indeed a curious illustration of the difficulties which have attended bankruptcy legislation in England that the very measure (the act of 1869) which was introduced to remedy this deplorable condition of affairs, was twelve years afterwards denounced in parliament by the president of the Board of Trade (Mr Joseph Chamberlain) as “the most unsatisfactory and most unfortunate of the many attempts which had been made to deal with the subject” and as “the object of the almost unanimous condemnation of all classes.” How was this? Under the act of 1869, the procedure under a bankruptcy petition was certainly rendered effective. Meetings of creditors were presided over and creditors’ claims were, for voting purposes, adjudicated upon by the registrar of the court; the bankrupt had to pass a public examination in court, which although chiefly left to the trustee appointed by the creditors, afforded some opportunity for investigation; and the bankrupt could not obtain his discharge without the approval of the court and in certain circumstances the consent of the creditors. An independent official, the comptroller in bankruptcy, was appointed, whose duty it was to examine the accounts of trustees, call them to account for any misfeasance, neglect or omission, and refer the matter to the court for the exercise of disciplinary powers where necessary. These provisions were well calculated to promote sound administration, but they were, unfortunately, rendered nugatory by provisions relating to what were practically private arrangements on similar lines to those which had rendered previous legislation ineffective. In some respects the evil was aggravated. Deeds of arrangements were nominally abolished, but under sections 125 and 126 of the act a debtor was empowered to present a petition to the court for liquidation of his affairs by “arrangement,” or for payment of a composition, whereupon a meeting of creditors was summoned from a list furnished by the debtor, and without any judicial investigation of claims, a majority in number and three-fourths in value of those who lodged proofs of debt, and who were present in person or by proxy at the meeting, might by resolution agree to liquidation by arrangement or to the acceptance of the composition. Such resolution thereupon became binding upon all the creditors, without any act of approval by the court, any judicial examination of the debtor, or any official supervision over the trustee’s accounts. The debtor was not permitted to present a bankruptcy petition against himself, and consequently his only method of procedure was that which thus removed the matter from the supervision and control of the court, and as about nine-tenths of all the proceedings under the act of 1869 were initiated by debtors, it followed that only about one-tenth was submitted to proper investigation. It is true that the creditors might refuse to assent to the debtor’s proposal, and that any creditor for £50 or upwards could present a petition in bankruptcy, but even where this course was adopted, the proceedings under the petition were, as a rule, stayed by the court if the debtor subsequently presented a proposal for liquidation or composition, and the creditor was left to pay the expenses of his petition if the requisite majority voted for the debtor’s proposal. So far, therefore, as the act was concerned, every inducement was held out to the adoption of a course which took the examination of the debtor, the conditions of his discharge and the audit of the trustee’s accounts, out of the control of the court.
Causes of failures of Acts
The establishment of a bankruptcy court, with its searching powers of investigation and its power of enforcing penalties on misconduct, can only be defended on the ground that the administration of justice is a matter affecting the interests of the community at large. But apart from the injury done to these interests by reducing the administration of justice to a question of barter and arrangement between the individuals immediately concerned, one of the chief reasons why the acts of 1849, 1861 and 1869 proved failures, lies in the obvious fact that the creditors of a particular estate are not, as appears to have been assumed, a homogeneous or organized body capable of acting together in the administration of a bankrupt estate. In the case of a few special and highly organized trades it may be otherwise, but in the great majority of cases the creditors have but little knowledge of each other or means of organized action, while they have neither the time nor the inclination to investigate the complicated questions which frequently arise, and which are therefore left in the hands of professional trustees or legal agents. But the appointment of trustees under these acts, instead of being the spontaneous act of the creditors, was frequently due to touting on the part of such agents themselves, or to individual creditors whose interests were not always identical with those of the general body. According to G. Y. Robson, the author of a standard work on the subject, the arbitrary powers conferred by the act of 1861 “led to great abuses, and in many cases creditors were forced to accept a composition, the approval of which had been obtained by a secret understanding between the debtor and favoured creditors, and not unfrequently by the creation of fictitious debts.” These evils were greatly aggravated by the decisions of the court relating to proofs on bills of exchange, under which it was held that the holder of a current bill could prove on the bankrupt estate of an indorser, although the bill was not yet due, and the acceptor was perfectly solvent and able to meet it at maturity. Thus in large mercantile failures, bankers and other holders of first-class bills could prove and vote on the estates of their customers, for whom the bills had been discounted, and thus control the entire proceedings, although they had no ultimate interest in the estate. But probably the greatest source of the abuses which arose under the act of 1869 was the proxy system established by the act and by the rules which were subsequently made to carry it out. The introduction of proxies was no doubt intended to give absent creditors an opportunity of expressing their opinions upon any question which might arise. But the system was too often used for the purpose of stifling the views of those who took an independent part in the proceedings. The form of proxy prescribed by the rules contained no limitation of the powers of the proxy-holder and no impression of the opinion of the creditor. It simply appointed the person named in it as “my proxy,” and these magic words gave the holder power to act in the creditor’s name on all questions that might be raised at any time during the bankruptcy. Hence arose a practice of canvassing for proxies, which were readily given under the influence of plausible representations, such as the holding out of the prospect of a large composition, but which, when once obtained, could be used for any purpose whatsoever except the receipt of a dividend. Thus it frequently happened that the entire proceedings were controlled by professional proxy-holders, in whose hands these documents acquired a marketable value. They were not only used to vote for liquidation by arrangement instead of bankruptcy proceedings, but not infrequently the matter took the form of a bargain between an accountant and a solicitor, under which the former became trustee and the latter the solicitor in the liquidation, without any provision for control over expenditure or for any audit of the accounts. Even where a committee of inspection was appointed to exercise functions of control and audit, they too were often appointed by the proxy-holders, and not infrequently shared in the benefits. On the other hand, where the amount of debts represented by the proxy-holder was insufficient to carry the appointment of a trustee and committee, the votes could be sold to swell the chances of some other candidate. Hence ensued a system of trafficking in these instruments, the cost of which had in the long run to come out of the estate. The result was that undesirable persons were too frequently appointed, whose main object was to extract from the estate as much as possible in the shape of costs of administration. The debtor was practically powerless to prevent this result. If he attempted to do so he sometimes became a target for the exercise of revenge. His discharge, which under liquidation by arrangement was entirely a matter for the creditors, might be refused indefinitely; and so largely and harshly was this power exercised under the proxy system, especially where it was supposed that the debtor had friends who could be induced to come to his aid, that a special act of parliament was passed in 1887, authorizing the court to deal with cases where, under the act of 1869, a debtor had not been able to obtain a release from his creditors. On the other hand, the complaisant debtor, although he had incurred large obligations in the most reckless manner, often succeeded in stifling investigation and obtaining his release without difficulty as a return for his aid in carrying out the arrangement.
The result of such a system could not be other than a failure. After the act of 1869 had been in operation for ten years, the comptroller in bankruptcy reported that out of 13,000 annual failures in England and Wales, there were only 1000 cases (or about 8%) “to which the more important provisions of the act for preventing abuses by insolvent debtors and professional agents applied; the other 12,000 cases (or 92%) escaping the provisions which refer to the examination and discharge of bankrupts, and to the accounts, charges and conduct of the agents employed.” It is not to be supposed that all the cases in the latter class were marked by the abuses which have been here described. In a large number the proceedings were conducted by agents of high character and standing, and with a due regard to the interests of the creditors. But the facilities for fraudulent and collusive arrangements afforded by the act, and the want of effective control over administration, inevitably tended to lower the morale of the latter, and to throw it into the hands of the less scrupulous members of the profession. The demand for reform, therefore, came from all classes of the business community. No fewer than thirteen bills dealing with the subject were introduced into the House of Commons during the ten years succeeding 1869. At length in 1879 a memorial, which was authoritatively described as “one of the most influential memorials ever presented to any government,” was forwarded to the prime minister by a large body of bankers and merchants in the city of London. The matter was then referred to the president of the Board of Trade (Mr Chamberlain), who made exhaustive inquiries, and in 1881 introduced a measure which, with some amendments, finally became law under the title of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.
Act of 1883
Hitherto the question had been dealt with as one of legal procedure; it was now treated as an act of commercial legislation, the main object of which, while providing by carefully framed regulations for the equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets, was to promote and enforce the principles of commercial morality in the general interests of the trading community. One of the chief features of the act of 1883 is the separation which it has effected between the judicial and the administrative functions which had previously been exercised by the court, and the transfer of the latter to the Board of Trade as a public department of the state directly responsible to parliament. Under the powers conferred by the act a new department was subsequently created under the title of the bankruptcy department of the Board of Trade, with an officer at its head called the inspector-general in bankruptcy. This department exercises, under the direction of the Board of Trade, a general supervision over all the administrative work arising under the act. It has extensive powers of control over the appointment of trustees, and conducts an audit of their accounts; and it may, subject to appeal to the court, remove them from office for misconduct, neglect or unfitness. A report upon the proceedings under the act is annually presented to parliament by the Board of Trade, and although the department is practically self-supporting, a nominal vote is each year placed upon the public estimates, thus bringing the administration under direct parliamentary criticism and control. The act also provides for the appointment and removal by the Board of Trade of a body of officers entitled official receivers, with certain prescribed duties having relation both to the conduct of bankrupts and to administration of their estates, including the interim management of the latter until the creditors can be consulted. These officers act in their respective districts under the general authority and directions of the Board of Trade, being also clothed with the status of officers of the courts to which they are attached.
While effecting this supervision and control by a public department directly responsible to parliament, the main objects of the measure were to secure:
(1) An independent and public investigation of the debtor’s conduct; (2) The punishment of commercial misconduct and fraud in the interests of public morality; (3) The summary and inexpensive administration of small estates where the assets do not exceed £300 by the official receiver, unless a majority in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors voting resolve to appoint a trustee; (4) Full control in other cases by a majority in value, over the appointment of a trustee and a committee of inspection; (5) Strict investigation of proofs of debt, with regulations as to proxies and votes of creditors; (6) An independent audit and general supervision of the proceedings and control of the funds in all cases.
Besides amending and consolidating previous bankruptcy legislation, the measure also contains special provisions for the administration under bankruptcy law of the estates of persons dying insolvent (§ 125); and for enabling county courts to make administration orders for payment by instalments in lieu of immediate committal to prison, in the case of judgment debtors whose total indebtedness does not exceed £50 (§ 122). It also provides for the getting in and administration by the Board of Trade of unclaimed dividends and undistributed balances on estates wound up under previous bankruptcy acts (§ 162). Lastly, it amends the procedure under the Debtors Act of 1869, dealing with criminal offences committed by bankrupts (which, prior to 1869, had been treated as part of the bankruptcy law), by enacting that when the court orders a prosecution of any person for an offence under that act, it shall be the duty of the director of public prosecutions to institute and carry on the prosecution.
Act of 1890
An amending act, under the title of the Bankruptcy Act 1890 was passed in that year, mainly with the view of supplementing and strengthening some of the provisions of the act of 1883, more particularly with regard to the conditions under which a bankrupt should be discharged or schemes of arrangement or composition be approved by the court. It also dealt with a variety of matters of detail which experience had shown to require amendment, with the view of more fully carrying out the intentions of the legislature as embodied in the principal act. These two acts are to be construed as one and may be cited collectively as the Bankruptcy Acts 1883 and 1890. They are further supplemented by a large body of general rules made by the lord chancellor with the concurrence of the president of the Board of Trade, which may be added to, revoked or altered from time to time by the same authority. These rules are laid before parliament and have the force of law.
Special Acts
Besides these general acts, various measures dealing with special interests connected with bankruptcy procedure have from time to time been passed since 1883, the chief of which are as follows, viz., the Bankruptcy Appeals (County Courts) Act 1884; the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888, regulating the priority of the claims of workmen and clerks, &c. for wages and salaries; and the Bankruptcy (Discharge and Closure) Act 1887, dealing with unclosed bankruptcies under previous acts.
Inquiry of 1906
It would be out of place in this article to attempt to answer the question how far later legislation has solved the difficult problems which prior to 1883 were found so intractable, but it may be mentioned that in 1906 the Board of Trade appointed a committee to inquire into and report upon the effect of the provisions of the laws in force at the time in the United Kingdom in relation to bankruptcy, deeds of arrangement and composition by insolvent debtors with their creditors, and the prevention and punishment of frauds by debtors on their creditors, and any points and matters upon which the existing laws seemed to require amendment. The committee received a vast amount of evidence as well as documents and memoranda from chambers of commerce, trade protection societies and influential public bodies. The scope of the inquiry was not limited to English law and procedure, but also embraced that of Germany, France, Australia, Scotland and Ireland. The report of the committee was issued in 1908 (Cd. 4068), and reference may be made to it for much valuable information. The committee reported that the result of their inquiry did not disclose any dissatisfaction on the part of the commercial community with the main features of the existing law and procedure. But there were certain special incidents of the law and branches of its administration upon which the committee made recommendations. One was the prosecution and punishment of debtors who had committed fraud on their creditors or caused loss to them by improper and reckless trading. The existing procedure was complained of as being dilatory, cumbersome and expensive, and the committee were of an opinion that where a debtor had committed an offence for which he could and ought to be prosecuted, prosecution and conviction, with adequate punishment, ought to follow speedily and decisively, and the chief recommendation of the committee was that, while the existing procedure should be left untouched, offences ought also to be punishable on summary conviction before magistrates and justices, and the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts applied to them, and that where an order for a prosecution is made on an application by the official receiver of a bankruptcy court and based on his report, that court should have power to order the official receiver to conduct the prosecution before the court of summary jurisdiction. The committee also reported that numerous delinquencies by insolvent debtors in the conduct of their affairs, or which had contributed to the losses sustained by their creditors, were not punishable or even cognizable by courts having bankruptcy jurisdiction unless or until a debtor who had a receiving order against him, or became a bankrupt, applied for an order sanctioning a composition or scheme of arrangement with his creditors, or for an order discharging him from his debts. The most prominent of these delinquencies which were brought to the notice of the committee were—failure by a debtor to keep any books or any proper or adequate books of account in his business; trading with knowledge of insolvency; gambling and speculation leading to, or contributing to, the debtor’s insolvency or bankruptcy; failure properly to account for any substantial deficiency of assets. The committee received a large body of evidence in favour of making delinquencies such as have been described punishable by imprisonment. Evidence was also given as to the laws in force in Germany, France and Scotland, from which it appeared that such delinquencies, especially that of keeping no books of account, can be severely dealt with as criminal offences.
After carefully weighing the evidence on both sides the committee recommended that the failure or omission by a debtor who becomes bankrupt to have kept any books of account, or proper books of account, within two years next preceding his bankruptcy, in a trade or business carried on by him, if without excuse, should be made by law an offence punishable on summary conviction by imprisonment, subject to four important limitations, namely, that the law should define what books of account a person carrying on a trade or business must keep, following in this respect the law in force in France and Germany; that failure or omission by a debtor to have kept the required books should only be punishable in the event of a debtor becoming bankrupt and of the liquidated debts proved in the bankruptcy exceeding £200 in amount; that no prosecution of a debtor for failure or omission to keep books of account should take place before the lapse of two years from the passing of the law; that a debtor should not be punished if he could show that his failure or omission to keep proper books was honest and excusable and did not contribute to his insolvency, and that no prosecution should be instituted for the offence except by order of the bankruptcy court. The committee made recommendations of much the same character with regard to punishing some of the other delinquencies mentioned above. There were also recommendations by the committee as to trading by undischarged bankrupts, as to the realization of estate on bankruptcy, as to the operation of the law of relation back of a bankruptcy trustee’s title, as to the law relating to the after-acquired property of an undischarged bankrupt, and dealings with such property, and with respect to married women and their liabilities under bankruptcy law. The committee also reported on the law and practice relating to voluntary deeds of arrangement between a debtor and his creditors and on the compulsory regulation of assignments of book debts, and of agreements for the hire and purchase of chattels.
Results of legislation
In addition to this report the annual reports of the Board of Trade, which are accompanied by elaborate tables of statistics, and by copious illustrations both of the working of the system and of the characteristic features and causes of current insolvency, are published as parliamentary papers, and may be usefully consulted by those interested in the subject. It appears from these reports that the total number of insolvencies dealt with under the bankruptcy acts during the ten years ending 31st December 1905, was 43,141, involving estimated liabilities amounting to £61,685,678, and estimated assets amounting to £26,001,417. It may also be pointed out that according to the official figures, the cost of bankruptcy administration under the present system has very considerably decreased as compared with that under the act of 1869. Estates are also closed at much shorter intervals, and, what is more important from a public point of view, it appears that while the estimated liabilities of bankrupt estates during the ten years ending 1883 amounted on an average to £22,380,000 per annum, the estimated liabilities during the ten years ending 1905 only averaged £6,168,567 per annum. But during the latter period there was an annual average of 3426 private arrangements involving a further estimated annual liability of £4,166,354 entered into outside of the Bankruptcy Acts by insolvent debtors. There are no means of ascertaining the corresponding amount of liabilities on private arrangements outside of the Bankruptcy Acts prior to 1883, and therefore a complete comparison is impossible; but it is evident that on any method of computation there has been a very great diminution in the trading insolvency of England and Wales, while it is also clear as a matter of general knowledge in commercial circles, that a great decrease in the proportion of fraudulent trade and reckless speculation has been a marked feature of private trading during the period in question.
The cost of bankruptcy administration is provided for:
(1) by fees charged to bankrupt estates, (2) by interest on balances at the credit of such estates with the bankruptcy estates account, and (3) by interest on unclaimed funds at the credit of estates under former Bankruptcy Acts.
Out of this are paid the salaries of all the officers of the department, including the official receivers; the remuneration due in respect of bankruptcy services to the county court registrars; pensions, etc., payable to retired officers under the present and previous Bankruptcy Acts; cost of bankruptcy prosecutions; and rents, stationery, travelling and other incidental expenses. The system is self-supporting and involves no charge upon the tax-payers of the country. It has been objected that inasmuch as the act professes to be based on the principle of enforcing commercial morality in the interests of the general community, the cost of administering it should not be charged entirely to the bankruptcy estates concerned. But when it is considered that a large part of the revenue of the department is derived from funds to which estates administered under the present act have contributed nothing, this objection does not appear to be well founded.
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica (1911)
Bankruptcy in other legal encyclopedias
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Meaning of Bankruptcy
The following is an old definition of Bankruptcy [1]: The status or condition of being a bankrupt; also, that branch of the law under which the assets of the estate of a bankrupt may be distributed among his creditors and he be discharged from the indebtedness. Bankruptcy is a proceeding of an equitable nature – a sequestration of a debtor’s property that the creditors may resort to, instead of to an ordinary suit at law or in equity. The object is equality of distribution of the assets among creditors not legally secured. Another purpose, only second in importance to that, is speedy distribution of assets. Our statutes have been filled with provisions designed to secure the early discharge of the debtor and the speedy settlement of his estate. Bankrupt laws are for the benefit of the honest trader, his honest creditors, and public commerce. ” The Congress shall have Power . . To establish . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” See Uniform. The English word ” bankrupt ” had its origin in incidents of trade. Whatever secondary or figurative meaning the word may have acquired, its primary and only legal meaning is that which confines it to traders. . As a state of “insolvency “usually precedes “bankruptcy,” it is not surprising that the two words should sometimes be confounded. Insolvency is the generic term, comprehending banliruptcy as a species. A man may be insolvent without becoming a bankrupt, or having capacity to become such; and a bankrupt may prove to be entirely solvent. Mere insolvency never makes one a bankrupt without the concurrence of some act tending to the injury of his creditors. The line of partition between bankrupt and insolvent laws is not so distinctly marked as to enable a person to say with precision what belongs exclusively to the one and not to the other class of laws. It is said that laws which merely liberate the person are insolvent laws, and those which discharge the contract are bankrupt laws. Another distinction, more uniformly observed, is, insolvent laws operate at the instance of an imprisoned debtor, bankrupt laws at the instance of a creditor. Still another feature of insolvent laws is, the debtor Is not discharged from the legal obligation to pay demands in full: he remains subject to suits and executions on account of unoutlawed claims. Fraudulent bankruptcy. Bankruptcy in which the debtor has practiced, or attempted to practice, some fraud upon creditors; as by not disclosing all of his assets, or by creating an unlawful preference. Private bankruptcy. Has been applied to oases of composition with creditors – resort to court for a discharge being thereby obviated. Voluntary bankruptey. That in which the debtor avails himself of the law. Involuntary or compulsory bankruptcy. In which the debtor, by proceedings instituted by one or more creditors, is judicially decided to be bankrupt. A case of voluntary bankruptcy is in the nature of a suit by the debtor against his creditors. Act of bankruptcy. An act by a debtor which exposes him to adverse proceedings in bankruptcy. Under the Act of March 2, 1867, amended by Acts of June 22, 1874, and of July 26, 1876, acts of bankruptcy were certain acts done by a debtor six mouths before an adjudication was sought: as, – (1) departing from the State to defraud creditors; (2) remaining absent with that intent; (3) concealing himself to avoid service of process; (4) concealing or removing property to prevent its being attached, taken, or sequestered; (5) assigning or giving away property or rights, to delay, defraud, or hinder creditors; (6) being held in custody or imprisoned seven days on account of a claim over one hundred dollars; (7) making, in contemplation of insolvency, a transfer of property, confessing a judgment, procuring or suffering property to be taken on process, with intent to prefer a creditor or to defeat or delay the operation of the bankrupt law; (8) for a bank, banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer, or miner, fraudulently to stop payment of commercial paper, or pot to resume payment thereof, for fourteen days; (9) for a bank or banker to fail to pay a depositor within forty days. 3 A debtor could have a jury trial upon any alleged act of bankruptcy. Foreigners were exempt from the law; also, a citizen whose provable debts were less than three hundred dollars. Proceedings were begun in the district court, by petition with annexed schedules of debts and assets. This petition was referred to the ” register ” – an auxiliary in matters of administration, – who ascertained whether the debts were above two hundred and fifty dollars; if so, the debtor was adjudged a bankrupt and ‘ his estate ipso facto became vested in the register. There then issued a warrant to the marshal to notify the creditors. In from ten to ninety days the creditors met and nominated an assignee, who, with his sureties, was to be approved by the court; whereupon, the register deeded the estate to the assignee, who proceeded to settle the business. Upon the commission of an act of bankruptcy the debtor’s property becomes a common fund for the payment of his debts, he losing all right of proprietor- ship over it. When there exists no purpose to defraud, delay, or prefer, and the value of the estate remains unimpaired, before proceedings are begun the debtor can deal with the property. Filing a petition is an attachment and an injunction – a caveat to all the world. After that, a person deals with the insolvent at his peril. A transfer designed to prevent equality of distribution, made within four months before petition filed, was held to be a fraud. So was giving a note confessing judgment. But in all such cases the intention of the debtor was made the test. Property illegally transferred was recoverable by the assignee. Excepting attachments made within a prescribed, period, and fraudulent dispositions, the assignee took title subject to all equities, liens, or incmnbrances – in the same plight and condition as when the debtor held it. Under the acts of Congress a voluntary bankrupt was to pay thirty per centum of the provable claims, unless less was accepted by one-fourth in number and one-third in value of the creditors. A majority in number and three-fourths in value could aocepf a composition. A discharge, which was a matter of favor, could be had one year after adjudication, an order having first been issued to such creditors as proved debts, to appear and show cause, if they knew of any, why the discharge should not be granted. And a discharge which had been granted could be annulled, within two years, for fraud undiscovered at the time of the discharge. A discharge is no bar to an action on a judgment recovered after the discharge, in a suit commenced before the bankruptcy, pending when the discharge was granted, and upon a debt provable in bankruptcy. A United States law supersedes a State law. But upon the repeal of a Federal law, a previously enacted State law becomes operative again. The convention which framed the Constitution had in view the English system. Bankrupt laws were passed by Congress in 1800, 1841, and 1867, but repealed, in each instance, after a comparatively brief operation. That of 1867, with its amendments, was repealed by act of June 7, 1878, the repeal taking effect September 1, 1878, without effect upon pending cases. Such laws have been in force in England for more than three centuries. They had their origin in the Boman law. See further Aes, Alienum; Cessio; Composition, 3; Contemplation; Death, Civil; Haereditas, Damnosa; Insolvency; Process, 1, Legal.
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Notes and References
- Concept of Bankruptcy provided by the Anderson Dictionary of Law (1889) (Dictionary of Law consisting of Judicial Definitions and Explanations of Words, Phrases and Maxims and an Exposition of the Principles of Law: Comprising a Dictionary and Compendium of American and English Jurisprudence; William C. Anderson; T. H. Flood and Company, Law Publishers, Chicago, United States)
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